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ABSTRACT
Irish Neutrality -  What are the Costs and Benefits of Ireland’s Policy of Neutrality?
Irish Neutrality is a policy that has evolved since the foundation of the State. The exposure 
to major conflicts since statehood was achieved by Ireland has been relatively limited. 
Ireland’s policy of neutrality has been essentially a pragmatic policy and in Irish terms 
successful as a neutral stance has assisted in affirming sovereignty for Ireland as an 
independent nation. The Irish people have cherished neutrality as a concept. Neutrality has 
become a symbol of Irish identity and has assisted in keeping Ireland out of war. With the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, changing World Order, increased European integration, freer 
movements of populations, new terrorists threats, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the time has come for neutral states to question whether a neutral stance is the 
most appropriate option to follow in the 21st century. My research explores Irish Neutrality, 
investigating initially definitions and obligations associated with neutrality, and examining 
the concept of Irish Neutrality from a historical perspective to assess its credibility and 
compatibility with membership of international organizations. The study further attempts to 
analyse the costs and benefits to Ireland of a neutral policy to ascertain if such a policy is 
the most appropriate for Ireland to follow. My research is important as Ireland, a country 
that values it contributions to UN membership, deploys its aimed forces on more robust UN 
missions, becomes a more established member of the EU and participates more effectively 
in PfP structures. While neutrality is referred to extensively by Irish politicians, it is not 
enshrined in the Irish Constitution and although it is a flexible and pragmatic policy, it is 
actually not a very tangible entity. To pursue a policy of neutrality implies the application 
of impartiality towards all belligerents in a conflict. Ireland has joined PfP which some 
Irish people see a stepping-stone to NATO membership. With increased participation in 
PfP mechanisms and improved interoperability between the Defence Forces and NATO 
members, there is a possibility that Irish Neutrality could be compromised. Relying on 
extensive text analysis and interviews with key informants of Irish Neutrality, my final 
analysis concludes that there has been limited debate on this subject and what is required is 
enlightened debate in order to assess it appropriateness for Ireland as European integration 
and expansion continues.
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CHAPTER 1 
ESTABLISHING THE QUESTION
Eire.. .sees her neutrality as positive, not merely negative. She has invested her self- 
respect in it. It is typical of her intense and narrow view of herself that she cannot 
see that her attitude must appear to England an affair of blindness, egotism, 
escapism or sheer funk. (Bowen, 1940; cited by Fisk, 1983:408)
Since statehood Ireland has aspired to the concept of neutrality, however Irish Neutrality is 
difficult to define. A neutral stance during WW2 assisted in ensuring that Ireland was 
spared the major ravages of this period. Following the end of the Cold War period, Irish 
foreign policy has evolved rapidly. The impacts of European foreign and security policies 
on Irish neutrality are sensitive issues in Ireland. In recent times, the subject of Irish 
Neutrality has been a matter for public debate and interest. Some Irish people believe that 
participation in PfP1 is a stepping-stone to full participation in NATO . 2 Participation in 
NATO would ultimately involve Ireland in a military alliance thus formally ending all 
aspirations to neutrality. Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Brian Cowen has stated:
It has never been the case that neutrality involves isolationism or that we are 
indifferent to the affairs of the world. It involves military neutrality. We’ve never 
been politically neutral. (Holland, 2003:12)
My initial impression of this statement was that it evoked ambiguity and lacked clarity as to 
how Ireland approaches the concept of neutrality in international affairs. Hakovirta, (1988) 
outlines that it seems obvious that a modest degree of clarity is a necessaiy precondition for 
a viable institution of neutrality. “This is so because without a modicum of clarity high 
degrees of credibility, acceptability, and respectability cannot be achieved” (Hakovirta, 
1988:257).
I was serving in Middle East with UNTSO 3 when the provision of refueling facilities at 
Shannon Airport to American military forces commenced in 2003. Providing refueling 
facilities and compatibility with neutrality ignited an interest in me to analyise Irish 
Neutrality.
1 Partnership for Peace
' North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
3 United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
1.1 Introduction
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1.2 Aim
My aim is to explore Irish Neutrality, examine the costs and benefits of a neutral policy and 
assess whether a neutral policy is an appropriate option for Ireland to follow. My study is 
relevant because it is important that Irish Neutrality be fully analyised with clarification 
provided to remove ambiguity so that the Defence Forces have clear direction as it 
participates in European Security mechanisms and UN missions. My research is especially 
significant for leadership and management of the Defence Forces with the advent of more 
robust UN Peacekeeping missions along with EU expansion and greater European Defence 
and Security integration. My intention will be to analyse the meaning of neutrality in an 
attempt to ascertain what neutrality means to Ireland. This will be followed by an 
examination of the emergence of Irish Neutrality, a focus on the credibility of Irish 
Neutrality and an assessment of the implications of a neutral policy on Ireland’s 
participation in regional and international organisations. My approach will be to provide a 
framework to evaluate Ireland’s neutral policy whereupon a comparison of Ireland’s neutral 
position with selected other European neutrals would be facilitated. My analysis of Irish 
Neutrality will provide a basis to evaluate the costs and benefits of a neutral policy which 
will assist in judging whether a neutral policy is appropriate for Ireland to follow in the 21st 
Century. I believe that a cost benefit analysis of Irish Neutrality has not been undertaken 
leaving a gap of knowledge in this area. Thus I have established my question: What are the 
Costs and Benefits of Ireland’s Policy of Neutrality?
1.3 Methodology Preview
In order to conduct a thorough examination of Irish Neutrality I earned out an exhaustive 
search of literature related to this subject. This included examining texts, newspaper articles 
and Internet sources relating to Irish Neutrality and neutrality as practiced by other 
European States. In addition I carried out semi-structured interviews with key informants of 
Irish Neutrality, related the information forwarded by the informants to my text review, 
analyised my findings and concluded. A detailed summary of my methodology is provided 
in Chapter 3.
2
CHAPTER 2
TRACING IRISH NEUTRALITY THROUGH LITERATURE
2.1 The Meaning of Neutrality.
Defining neutrality along with precise duties and obligations that a neutral state must 
adhere to is difficult. Fitzgerald, (1998:18) puts it simply by concluding that “Irish 
neutrality does not conform to the classic definitions of neutrality,” outlining that neutrality 
represented an assertion of sovereignty and a powerful uniting force for the Irish 
population. There are numerous similarities in what writers outline as definitions of 
neutrality. According to Salmon, (1989), “The essence of neutrality is a deliberate, 
conscious policy of impartial abstention during a war or armed conflict with concomitant 
rights and duties, together with an intention to resist violations of those rights and duties by 
armed resistance if necessary,” (Salmon, 1989:27). Keatinge, (1984) is more specific 
suggesting that the meaning of neutrality is not being involved in wars between other states, 
a condition that has strict legal basis in the Fifth and Thirteenth Hague Conventions of 
19074. As a legal status neutrality involves the right to respect for the neutral country’s 
integrity from the belligerent states, while in return certain obligations must be fulfilled. 
Keatinge suggests that the primary neutrality duties are based on three general principles:
• The use of national territory must be denied, by force if necessary, to all belligerents 
by the state,
• No support must be given to belligerents by the state, although normal trade may 
continue,
• The rules of neutrality under international law must be applied impartially.
(Keatinge, 1984:3)
Salmon, (1989:16) also contends that “neutrals must prevent belligerents, even by means of 
physical resistance and fighting, from making use of their territory or their resources for 
military puiposes during the war”. Thus a declaration of neutrality, he contends, is not 
enough. The neutral state must demonstrate a willingness to uphold that condition. This 
stand has obvious implications for the credibility of Irish Neutrality which I will examine in 
due course. Hakovirta, (1988:14) outlines “originally neutrality meant abstention in the
4 Conventions respecting the rights and duties o f  neutral Powers and Persons in case o f  war on land. The
Hague, 18 October 1907.
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sense of non-participation in wars waged by other states”. From the eighteenth centuiy 
onwards, Hakovirta (1988) outlines that the original idea of neutrality as non-participation 
in war was gradually complemented by the concept of impartiality, meaning equal 
treatment of belligerents.
The question of neutrality only applying in time of war as posited by Doherty (2002) and 
not explicitly outlined by the other writers is debatable. She explains that the laws of 
neutrality only apply in time of war. In peacetime, law regulates only the conduct of those 
states that are neutral as a result of an international Treaty. She distinguishes those states 
that are neutral by law, neutralised states and those states that are neutral by convention i.e. 
Austria and Switzerland5. States whose neutrality does not have a basis in law include 
Sweden, Finland and Ireland. Doherty, (2002:13) further outlines that “for Ireland 
neutrality effectively began with the Second World War and has been maintained since in 
the absence of any strategic necessity”. Drawing these definitions together, the basic 
concepts of neutrality are impartiality, no support to be provided to belligerents and a 
State’s inherent duty of defending neutrality if it is to be considered neutral and in a 
position to benefit from a neutral stance.
2.2 Emergence of Irish Neutrality and its consequences during WW2.
The terms of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty made a credible policy of neutrality impossible 
due to the conditions it placed on the Irish Free State’s defence policy and status. 6 There is 
no explicit reference to neutrality in Bunreacht na hEireann (Irish Constitution) of 1937. 
Salmon, (1989:86) contends that in the first meeting of the Dail on 21 January 1919 “the 
real concern was, and has remained, independence, not the question of alliance or 
neutrality”. “Historically, anti-imperialistic attitudes underpinned the labyrinthine 
neutrality aspirations inherent in traditional Irish nationalism”, (Duggan, 1996:17). It has 
been argued by (Doherty, 2002:17) “Irish Neutrality is not so much principled neutrality as 
unprincipled non-belligerency”. The commitment to a doctrine of neutrality is questioned 
by Fanning who contends:
5 The 1955 Austrian State Treaty and its constitution bind Austria to neutrality. Switzerland received its 
neutrality through the Peace o f  Westphalia (1640).
6 Facilities were ceded to Britain in the form o f  three ports, Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly. British 
control o f  the ports was coupled with restrictions in the size o f  the army, (Doherty, 2002:30).
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Neither de Valera nor his colleagues of the revolutionary period were ideologically 
committed to any theory or doctrine of neutrality. The Irish commitment was to the 
ideology of independence, whether in the shape of Collins’ ‘freedom to achieve 
freedom’ or of de Valera’s Republic. (Fanning, 1982:121)
Doherty, (2002:30) explains “the emergence of Irish Neutrality was intricately bound up 
with Ireland’s relationship with Britain and contingent Irish aspirations for independence 
and unity”.
In presenting the 1938 Anglo Irish Agreement to the Dail, Keatinge, (1984: 16) states that 
“De Valera emphasized the achievement of sovereignty rather than neutrality, implying that 
neutrality was an instrumental objective rather than a primary purpose in his policy”. 
Ireland did not adopt an excessively legalistic view of neutrality because the preservation of 
neutrality required that Ireland adopt a “benevolent attitude towards Britain”, (Doherty, 
2002:34). This is also posited by (Fitzgerald, 1997:13) who contends that it is debatable 
whether Ireland can be correctly described as having being neutral due to the scale of 
assistance given secretly to Britain being scarcely “compatible with the concept of 
neutrality under international law” . 7 Drawing from these authors it can be seen that Ireland 
was principally concerned with independence, sovereignty, anti-imperialism as opposed to 
neutrality during WW2.
O’Halpin, (1999) presents the controversial F.S.L Lyons passage that the consequence of
Irish Neutrality during the period was:
Her almost total isolation from the rest of mankind... It was as if an entire people 
had been condemned to live in Plato’s cave, with their backs to the fire of life and 
deriving their only knowledge of what went on outside from the flickering shadows 
thrown on the wall before their eyes by the men and women who passed to and fro 
behind them. When after six years they emerged, dazzled, from the cave into the 
light of day, it was to a new and vastly different world. (O’Halpin, 1999:254)
O’Halpin, (1999) states that this now seems at once an overstatement and an underestimate 
of the impact of neutrality on the state and its people, that the physical benefits of 
successful neutrality were enormous but neutrality undoubtedly soured Anglo-Irish 
relations, and widened the psychological gulf between de Valera’s Ireland and Unionist 
Ulster. He feels that in setting out to stay neutral, Ireland did no more than what almost 
every other small state sought to do. Fisk, (1983) posits that it was inevitable that in
7 Fitzgerald quotes a British War Cabinet memorandum in February 1945 outlining ten (10) cooperation 
arrangements between Ireland and Britain.
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wartime Irish neutrality would be perceived on both sides of the Irish Sea as essentially
anti-British. O’Halpin, (1999:256) tells us that:
A combination of circumstances, including geography, diplomatic adroitness, the 
running  sore of partition, covert security co-operation and British restraint, meant 
that Irish neutrality proved not only domestically popular but extremely sustainable.
However popular on the domestic front, it is Fisk, (1983) who provides us with an account 
of the one politician, James Dillon8, who vehemently opposed Irish neutrality in WW2, 
arguing from a moral and religious standpoint rather than political reasons that Ireland 
should abandon neutrality and that the Allies should be openly supported for their sacrifices 
against the inhuman deeds of Nazi atrocities. A cost of Irish Neutrality in Dillon’s view 
would be the unfavourable comments towards Ireland from Britain and the United States, 
both countries of tremendous importance to Ireland economically and politically. Such 
comments were bound to have an impact economically when the war ended.
Another issue concerning Irish Neutrality during WW2 was the subject of partition. As
Patterson, (2002:63) explains:
Neutrality encouraged the most self satisfied and parochial elements of Irish society 
and would pose a major problem of adjustment when the state wished to reintegrate 
itself into the wider world when the war ended. It also deepened the division on the 
island and made the ending of partition even more unlikely than it appeared in 1939.
The then Taoiseach Eamon DeValera addressed the Dail in May 1939
We believe that no other position would be accepted by the majority of our people 
as long as the present position [partition] exists, (Murphy, 1975:100).
Doherty, (2002:33) tells us “partition was cited by the Irish throughout the war to 
counteract criticism of neutrality”. The implementation of neutrality was by no means 
simple, according to Keatinge, (1984), neither was the motivation behind it. For DeValera, 
the exercise of sovereignty was its primary justification, contending “it was the linkage 
between neutrality and the partition issue which proved to be the persistent theme of Anglo- 
Irish relations during the war ” (Keatinge, 1984:18). This would lead one to believe that 
partition was an overriding issue for Ireland’s neutral stance during WW2. The question 
arises did we leave ourselves out on an unnecessary limb because of partition?
8 James Dillon Fine Gael T.D. who adopted a singular stance on Irish Neutrality during the Second World 
War years, calling on the country to support the A llies against the N azis’ threat to democracy, ultimately 
resigning from the Fine Gael party on this issue.
6
It is Doherty’s, (2002) suggestion that we did and that in the immediate aftermath of the 
war, neutrality was viewed as a coward’s way of avoiding one’s obligations and this 
coloured attitudes towards Ireland. 9 Irish Neutrality during WW2 became associated with 
an increasingly isolationist foreign policy as Keatinge presents the quote “ Ireland slept 
behind a ‘Green Cutrain ... Thought-proof, World-proof, Life-proof ” (Keatinge, 
1984:20). However, the success of Irish Neutrality during WW2 should not be under 
estimated as more than any other event since independence, neutrality put a stamp on the 
State and underlined its homogeneity as Murphy, (1975) contends:
The success of the policy not only saved the country from the ravages of war, it did 
much to emphasise the consciousness of sovereignty, renew a sense of national 
confidence, heal the wounds of the Civil War through a common dedication to a 
national purpose and at the same time, paradoxically, sublimate anti-British 
hostility (Murphy, 1975:107).
Whatever the debate, the real cost of Irish Neutrality during WW2 was delayed entry to the 
United Nations. Doherty (2002) contends that the opposition presented to Irish applications 
for United Nations membership after WW2, a factor that led to considerable diplomatic 
isolation up until 1955 when Ireland eventually gained membership was a result of 
Ireland’s neutral stance. Keatinge, (1978) highlights that Irish applications for membership 
of the United Nations was denied to Ireland because of the Soviet Union’s opposition, 
ostensibly because of Irish Neutrality10.
2.3 Credibility of Irish Neutrality.
The greater the credibility of a State’s neutrality, the more likely it is that it will be 
respected. As explained by Hakovirta (1988) the credibility of Irish Neutrality is 
questionable:
The overall credibility of Ireland’s neutrality is by any normal standards low, but 
that has not prevented it from gaining respect by outstanding contributions to UN 
peacekeeping and thought provoking regional peace designs. Ireland has to some 
extent been able to accommodate itself to the problem of credibility by introducing 
it own, particularly narrow, criteria of neutrality (Hakovirta, 1988:35).
9 ‘Let not too fine a point be put upon it. The neutrality o f  Southern Ireland in the 1939-1945 war was a 
disgrace to the Irish name, a sheltering behind the backs o f  better and braver men.’ Riddel, P (1970), Fire over 
Ulster, London, Hamish Hamilton, pp 87-88.
10 The Soviet Union vetoed Ireland’s admission to the United Nations on four occasions between 1946-1955.
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Hakovirta further argues that by constantly maintaining their distance from the alliances, 
the neutrals have contributed to the credibility, acceptability and respectability of European 
neutrality. The conventional external view of Irish defence policy is that “implicitly Ireland 
relies upon the aimed forces of the West for its security, and thus maintains armed forces 
totally inadequate for effective self defence” (Keatinge, 1984:74). In purely military terms, 
Irish Neutrality lacks credibility. Salmon suggests that:
Ireland has consistently failed to measure up to the principal requisites ‘o f  and for’ 
neutrality. There has been ‘no set of common principles’ underlying defence policy. 
Despite the shibboleth of neutrality, and the claims of the Irish themselves, Ireland 
has never been truly neutral, (Salmon, 1989:309).
A specific internal condition of successful neutrality that is posited by nearly all writers is 
the existence of a credible national defence policy. Ireland’s position in this area is limited. 
Keatinge, (1984) reminds us that a retired Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces claimed in 
1982 that the existing level of defence resources was inadequate for the defence of 
neutrality, that Ireland depends on the armed forces of the West for its security and 
maintains a Defence Forces totally inadequate for Ireland’s self defence. Keatinge, (1984) 
contends that Irish Defence expenditure and manpower is low by Western European 
standards, concluding that Ireland is not effectively armed to defend its neutrality.
Both (Salmon, 1989:251) and (Keatinge, 1984:73) recount Mr. Noel Dorr 11 where he 
admitted,
We are small, militarily insignificant...and have acknowledged our own 
vulnerability. Our armed forces are about the same size, and serve the same 
peacekeeping and other purposes, as those which every country would be allowed to 
maintain in a disarmed world. 12
Salmon, (1989:310) offers, “ the equation of ‘military neutrality’ with neutrality per se is 
singularly in appropriate in the Irish case, because of its totally inadequate, unilateral 
defensive measures and effort”. The point emerging is that due to limited expenditure and 
no perceived or obvious threat, Ireland does not satisfy the basic requirement to have a 
credible Defence Force, one of the obligations of a neutral policy being the need to provide 
for an effective armed forces to defend a neutral stance.
11 Irish Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
12 Statement on Disarmament 02 November 1982 in the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee.
2.4 Irish Neutrality - UN/EEC/EU/PfP Membership.
The compatibility of Ireland’s membership of these organisations and being neutral is a
matter for examination, and discussion. Keatinge, (1984) states that the main emphasis in
Ireland’s ‘peace policy’ involves UN peacekeeping operations, an activity in which Ireland
has been almost continuously engaged since the 1950’s. This task is likewise characteristic
of the foreign policies of the other neutrals. Keatinge, (1984:51) further explains that:
A policy of ‘active neutrality’ necessarily involves the neutral country to some 
degree in major diplomatic issues, thus facing it with the prospect of incurring the 
wrath of potential belligerents or members of military blocs.
Membership of the UN was an opportunity to recover the standing Ireland once had in the 
League of Nations13 which had been destroyed by neutrality during WW2. Duggan 
outlines:
That Ireland by the War’s end sensed the importance for the future to a small weak 
country of justice and order in international life. Only an effective international 
organization such as the UN could achieve this. This is why this country opted in to 
the UN and out of NATO”, (Duggan, 1996:23).
UN Membership is explained by Doherty, (2002) as the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy 
with Ireland’s peacekeeping tradition displaying commitment to both the UN and the cause 
of world peace. Duggan (1996) contends that joining the UN and subscribing to the concept 
of collective security was a move away from the illusion that Ireland’s military neutrality 
equated to the absolute neutrality of countries like Sweden and Switzerland.
The basic principles of Ireland’s UN policy, on entry in 1955, as enunciated by the Minister
for External Affairs, Liam Cosgrave included the aim:
‘...to avoid becoming associated with particular blocs or groups as far as possible’ 
and the aim ‘to preserve the Christian civilization of which we are a part and with 
that end in view to support wherever possible those powers principally responsible 
for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of Communist 
power and influence’ (Keatinge, 1984:22).
It has been suggested that Ireland abandoned its aspirations to neutrality by joining the 
EEC. Keatinge, (1984:45) states that Ireland “definitely parted company” with the other 
neutrals by seeking full EEC membership in 1961 and joining in 1973. Ireland accepted the
13 The Irish Free State was admitted to the League o f  Nations on 11 July 1924.
political responsibilities of EEC membership with only some economic reservations. 
Hakovirta, (1988) points out that Ireland actively supported the building of a politically 
united Europe and that the question of neutrality was never put forward as an argument by 
Ireland when applying to join the EEC apart from the intention to stay out of military 
alliances.
There is no doubt that joining the EEC set Ireland apart from other neutrals but has 
membership of the EEC diluted the concept of Irish Neutrality? A high watermark 
concerning the position of Irish Neutrality post WW2 was presented by Taoiseach Sean 
Lemass in 1961 when he stated:
We recognize that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence of our 
joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the 
technical label of neutrality, we are prepared to go into this integrated Europe 
without any reservations as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy 
and defence (Hakovirta, 1988:132).
Lemass’s successor, Jack Lynch took the same approach when he declared in 1969 “ we 
have never been ideologically neutral” and when he reiterated Ireland’s interest “in the 
defence of the territories embraced by the European Communities”(Fanning, 1983:43). 
Membership of the European Community is outlined by (Duggan, 1996:27) as challenging 
our ‘traditional neutrality’. He quotes Minister for External Affairs (Mr Patrick Hillery) 
who stated:
“While Ireland remained neutral during World War 2 we have never adopted a permanent 
policy in the doctrinaire or ideological sense”. Joining the EEC presented Ireland with 
three sets of problems concerning neutrality.
• Whether a neutral countiy could join anything other than a universal organisation 
such as the UN,
• To what extent could the EEC be regarded as a regional organisation free of 
military purposes?
• The problem presented by the development of the European Political Cooperation 
process, (Sharp, 1999:205).
Irish government attitudes refuted these problems as Sharp, (1999) outlines that Ireland 
rejected the argument that membership of the EEC was inconsistent with the principles of 
neutrality establishing that neutrality viewed as such would be impractical as Ireland could 
not avoid dealing with countries on issues that might have some military implications. In
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addition if the UN was the only organization that Ireland could join, this could imply a 
moral isolationism which would not accord with fundamental Irish values.
Ireland joined PfP in 1999 whereupon Ireland and other non-NATO members are free to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will participate in a particular PfP activity. 
Doherty, (2002:198) states that the new world order “has challenged Ireland to become 
involved in peacekeeping in Europe and this has meant considering relations with NATO 
through PfP”. She contends that those opposed to Irish membership of PfP claimed that the 
treaty marked a further step in the steady erosion of neutrality and that it strengthened the 
EU’s links with nuclear weapons based groups. An erosion of Ireland’s middle power 
standing by joining PfP is also suggested by (Muiphy, 2002:34) and may make “forging 
and maintaining other global links more difficult.” The objectives of PfP contain a 
substantial focus on peace keeping and this is attractive to all neutral states. The 
deficiencies in the UN have resulted in regional organizations such as NATO/PfP stepping 
in to fill the breach with implications of these developments for Ireland’s participation in 
peacekeeping which could affect Irish Neutrality. Through PfP, NATO can bring together 
the countries of Eastern Europe and the European neutrals that all have considerable 
peacekeeping experience. “PfP includes most of the other neutral Europeans, and former 
Warsaw Pact members,” (Murphy, 2002:34). PfP can be viewed as a model of cooperation, 
which helps to provide regional support for UN peace support efforts. Doherty, (2002:221) 
states that the government advocated membership for a number of reasons:
• Participation in PfP does not entail alliance commitments,
• The importance of the PfP for peacekeeping particularly in Europe and
• The benefits to be gained by the Defence Forces.
Doherty, (2002:222) explains that in Ireland the debate on PfP and Ireland’s delay in 
joining the organization displayed “the constraints placed on Ireland by neutrality as 
conceived by a small vocal minority.” Doherty, (2002:248) also contends, “Ireland is part 
of a wider club of nations and cannot be isolated from what goes on outside the frontiers of 
the state”. There has been a failure of political parties to tackle the neutrality issue and 
explain the significance of European security developments for Ireland to the public who
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have at best a very vague conception of neutrality. Politicians have been discouraged by the 
small but emotive nature of the debate on neutrality and by public support for neutrality. 
There should be more public debate on the costs and benefits of a neutral policy. Doherty, 
(2002:251) further contends that the emphasis on “crisis management ensures that 
neutrality remains compatible with EU security integration and ensures that the neutrals 
have no need to join military alliances in order to participate in the European security 
architecture”. Keatinge, (1984:113) suggests that:
Neutrality is seen as being one of three ‘inter related components of a distinctive 
stance’ in Ireland’s international image, along with UN peacekeeping and 
development cooperation; it is argued that it is the coherence of this stance which is 
‘persuasive’, and that the loss of neutrality would therefore seriously detract from 
other elements.
The Fine Gael Party outlined in Beyond Neutrality, (2003) that Ireland has reacted to EU 
issues involving security, rather than proactively staking out a position. Fine Gael contend 
that domestic political debate on these issues has rarely got beyond either accusations of 
“betraying” Irish neutrality or “safeguarding” it in an ever more integrated European 
Union. Fine Gael explain that Irish Neutrality was associated with a cluster of values 
ranging from sovereignty, anti-Britishness and a quasi pacifist rejection of everything 
nuclear.
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2.5 Conclusion
From my review of literature I conclude that a policy of neutrality demands abstention from 
war complimented with impartiality towards all belligerents in a conflict. Irish Neutrality 
may not conform to a classical definition of neutrality and history has shown that Ireland 
was spared the ravages of WW2 through a successful neutral stance. This neutral stance 
proved to be veiy popular with the Irish people as it assisted in establishing Irish 
sovereignty, copper fastened Irish independence and was deemed a pragmatic stance due to 
the issue of partition. During the Cold War period, Ireland unlike other European neutrals 
did not make substantial provision for its own defence nor did it regard its neutrality as 
precluding membership of the EEC. However the credibility of Irish Neutrality may be 
tenuous in that unlike other European neutrals, Ireland’s ability to defend neutrality is 
questionable. As an established member of the UN, EU and now PfP, traditional Irish 
neutrality is being challenged. Ireland has proven her sovereignty through neutrality but 
there may be a danger of self enforced isolationism in the continuance of a neutral policy. 
UN membership is the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy. Ireland must adapt to the 
dramatic changes that have occurred in the context of European security and changing 
World Order. Neutrality, a policy that has been embraced by the Irish people is a sensitive 
issue in Ireland and has consequently acted as a constraining factor in public debates. The 
importance of examining the implications of Irish Neutrality concerning Defence Forces 
participation on UN missions, PfP events and EU related issues is a matter for this study.
My examination will have the aim of ascertaining the costs and benefits of Ireland’s policy 
of neutrality in order to assess if a neutral stance is an appropriate option for Ireland to 
follow in the 21st Century.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this thesis involved primary and secondary sources of qualitative 
research. Towards answering my primary question: What are the costs and  benefits o f  
Ire la n d ’s Policy o f  Neutrality?  I conducted:
• A Descriptive Review of Irish Neutrality as it has emerged from the foundation of 
the Irish Free State to the present day.
• Detailed text and document analysis of Irish Neutrality focusing on the High Court 
judgement delivered by Justice Kearns on 28th April 2003, Government policy 
documents and publications, political party press releases and policy documents, 
press reports and articles concerning Irish Neutrality sourced from the Internet.
• Semi structured interviews with key informants on Irish Neutrality including:
o Mr Edward Brannigan - First Secretary International Security Policy 
Section, Irish Dept of Foreign Affairs, 
o Professor Dermot Keogh - Historian and Lecturer UCC. 
o Comdt Edward Horgan Retd - International Secretary PANA. 
o Ms Patricia McKenna MEP - Irish Green Party.
o Lt Gen Gerard McMahon Retd - Former Chief of Staff Irish Defence Forces
Feb 95 to Aug 98.
o Lt Col Jim Burke - Lecturer Irish National Defence Policy, Military College, 
o Mr Gay Mitchell TD - Fine Gael Spokesman on Foreign Affairs.
Through these methods I established findings around the following central themes:
• Emergence of Irish Neutrality
• Credibility of Irish Neutrality
• Costs of Neutrality
•  Benefits o f  N eutrality
• Compatibility of Neutrality with membership of International Organisations
3.1 Methodology Outline
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I used these parameters as building blocks to assess Irish Neutrality and compare Irish 
Neutrality with neutrality as practiced by selected European neutral countries including 
Sweden, Austria and Switzerland. From my comparison, text and interview analysis I 
planned to be in a position to deduce whether a policy of neutrality was the most 
appropriate for Ireland to follow in the 2 1st Century.
3.2 Considerations and Limitations
In relation to document selection I was influenced by Bell (2002:111) in that the amount of 
documentaiy material that I could study would inevitably be influenced by the amount of 
time available and that familiarity with different categories of evidence would help me 
make decisions about what is fundamental to my research. My intent being to make as 
balanced a selection as possible bearing in mind the constraints of time. I was also guided 
by Denscombe (2000: 163) drawing on the basis that Government publications would 
provide documentaiy sources of information that are authoritative, objective and factual. 
However I was also mindful as to what Denscombe (2000:164) maintains that the extent to 
which documents can live up to the image of being authoritative, objective and factual 
depends very much on the data they contain.
The candidates that I decided to interview were selected based on their active 
interest in Irish Neutrality and in seeking out key informants to interview, I limited myself, 
concentrating on puiposive sampling having being guided by Denzin and Lincoln (1994) 
quoted in Silverman (2000:104)...Many qualitative researchers employ purposive and not 
random sampling methods. They seek out groups, settings and individuals where the 
processes being studied are most likely to occur. My key informants have a special interest 
in Irish Neutrality, having written about the subject, lectured in the area and spoken in 
public about this issue.
Concerning interview structure, I was guided by what Lofland and Lofland, (1995) cited by 
Robson, (2002:281) stress as the importance of an interview guide:
. . . a  guide is not a tightly structured set of questions to be asked verbatim as written, 
accompanied by an associated range of preworded likely answers. Rather it is a list of 
things to be sure to ask. The conduct of my interviews were centered upon predetermined 
questions of a questionnaire lasting about one hour. I was open to any observations that my
informants wished to present that would have been of assistance to me in critically 
examining my chosen subject. Likewise I was influenced by Flick (2002:91) who states “it 
is hoped that the questions will be answered freely by the interviewee”. This was especially 
relevant as one of my interviewees was a serving officer in the Defence Forces and another 
was an official in the Dept of Foreign Affairs. Flick (2002) highlights one of the problems 
of semi structured interviews as that of mediating between the input of the interview guide 
and the aims of the research question and by sticking too rigidly to the interview guide, 
there is a danger that openness might be restricted. I considered that all my interviewees 
addressed my questions with openness and forthrightness thus facilitating critical analysis.
In addition I was also influenced both by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) cited by 
Silverman (2001:95) who deem that ...Accounts are not simply representations of the 
world; they are part of the world they describe and by Holstein and Gumbrium (1997) cited 
by Silverman (2001:95) who contend ...Construed as active, the subject behind the 
respondent not only holds facts and details of experience, but, in the veiy process of 
offering them up for response, constructively adds to, takes away from, and transforms the 
facts and details. The respondent can hardly spoil what he or she is, in effect, subjectively 
creating.
Due to limited time I did not conduct a survey into current Irish attitudes to neutrality. I was 
influenced by Robson (2002) who warns that surveys are not suited to exploratory work, 
contending that asking a large number of open ended questions could be inefficient and 
ineffective procedure, taking a considerable time to analyse. However I recommend a 
survey into Irish attitudes to neutrality would be part of a further research study.
3.3 Comparative Case Studies
In tandem with my text analysis of Irish Neutrality and semi-structured interviews, I 
conducted exploratory case studies by comparing neutrality as practiced in Sweden, 
Finland, Austria and Switzerland with Ireland’s neutral policy14. These comparisons were 
of assistance to me for analysis and reference to information gleaned from text analysis and 
semi structured interviews with my key informants.
14 Refer to Appendix 4 for a synopsis o f  neutral European countries.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter will present the results of my research study. Firstly, my findings are presented 
in relation to text and document analysis and secondly in relation to my interview 
questionnaire. My text and document analysis focused on:
• The judgement of Mr Justice Kearns delivered on 28th April 2003 in High Court 
Case between Mr Edward Horgan and An Taoiseach, The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, The Minister for Transport, The Government of Ireland and the Attorney 
General. Mr Horgan claimed that Ireland was in breach of Ireland’s neutral State 
duty not to permit the movement of troops and convoys of either munitions of war 
or supplies across its territory as a neutral Power, that participation by the State in 
the transit of US supplies to the war in Iraq constituted a breach of Article 28.315 of 
the Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann).
• Government of Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs Policy Document: 
Partnership for Peace An Explanatory Guide and the Government of Ireland 
Department of Foreign Affairs Press Release regarding the Seville Declarations to 
the Nice Treaty.
• Fine Gael Political Party Policy Document, Beyond Neutrality, concerning Ireland’s 
responsibilities regarding international Defence co-operation and European Security 
issues.
Throughout my research I have concentrated on the central themes of:
• Emergence of Irish Neutrality
• Credibility of Irish Neutrality
• Costs of Irish Neutrality
• Benefits of Irish Neutrality
• Compatibility of Irish Neutrality with Membership of International Organisations
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH FINDINGS
15 Refer to Appendix 2 for Extract from Article 28.3 Bunreacht na hEireann.
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4.2 Findings Text and Document Analysis
4.2.1 Judgement of Justice Kearns delivered on 28 April 2003
Justice Keams outlined that domestic courts in the interest of comity do not rule on 
questions of international law which affect foreign sovereign states. However, the findings 
in the case nevertheless provide an important benchmark to assess the legal standing of 
Irish Neutrality. Justice Keams confirmed that despite great historic value being attached 
by Ireland to the concept of neutrality, that status is nowhere reflected in Bunreacht na 
hEireann, or elsewhere in any Irish domestic legislation. It is effectively a matter of 
government policy only, albeit a policy to which, traditionally at least, considerable 
importance was attached. Justice Keams stated that there is an identifiable rule of 
customary law in relation to the status of neutrality whereupon a neutral state may not 
permit the movement of large numbers of troops or munitions of one belligerent state 
through the territory en route to a theatre of war with another. He further outlined that 
Ireland is in a different position than certain other States, who have incorporated a 
permanent status of neutrality in their domestic laws. Notwithstanding, he decided that it 
did not appear to him that the more qualified or nuanced form of neutrality than the 
provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention V as argued by the defendants in this case 
includes the notion that the granting of passage over its territory by a neutral state for a 
large number of troops and munitions from one belligerent state only en route to a theatre 
of war with another is compatible with the status of neutrality in international law. Thus, he 
endorsed the sentiment that the use of Shannon Airport by US troops was inconsistent with 
Ireland’s policy of neutrality.
4.2.2 Policy Document Dept of Foreign Affairs- PfP Explanatory Guide
This policy document outlines that Irish military neutrality is a policy to which the 
Government of Ireland is deeply attached. The documents explains that
• Ireland has never been ideologically neutral, nor morally indifferent to the major 
international and security challenges of the day.
• Irish Neutrality is not doctrinaire neutrality, isolated from the evolving international 
security realities.
• Ireland’s neutrality originated as an important expression of sovereignty.
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• Irish Neutrality has not been imposed from outside nor is it guaranteed by 
international treaty.
• Irish Neutrality is policy espoused by successive Irish Governments.
• The core-defining characteristic of Irish Neutrality is non-membership of military 
alliances.
The document further explains that there is no conflict between Ireland’s military neutrality 
and full and active support by Ireland for collective security, based on international law.
4.2.3 Seville Declarations by the Government of Ireland on the Nice Treaty
The Government of Ireland stressed that the purpose of the Declarations is to make clear, 
beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Nice Treaty poses no threat to Ireland’s traditional 
policy of military neutrality. Through the Declarations Government reaffirm that:
• Ireland is not party to any mutual defence commitment.
• Ireland is not party to any plans to develop a European army.
• Ireland will take a sovereign decision, on a case-by-case basis, on whether the 
Defence Forces should participate in humanitarian or crisis management tasks 
undertaken by the EU, based on the triple lock of UN authorization, Government 
decision and approval by Dail Eireann.
The Declarations also reaffirm that Ireland will not adopt any decision taken by the 
European Council to move to a common defence, or ratify the traditional policy of military 
neutrality, unless it has first been approved by the Irish people in a referendum.
4.2.4 Fine Gael Policy Document - Beyond Neutrality
Fine Gael in its document, Beyond Neutrality, contend that Ireland will have to decide 
whether to remain militarily unaligned, join a EU Common Defence arrangement or join 
NATO. Due to the changing European security architecture, Fine Gael maintain that not 
only should Ireland be part of the EU Defence and Security architecture, Ireland should be 
one of the architects helping to design the evolving systems. This is based on the belief that 
if Ireland fails to be proactive now with regard to emerging EU Defence systems, the 
system that Ireland will have the option to be part of will be one devised by other nations. 
What has been lacking in Ireland according to Fine Gael is open and honest debate on Irish 
Neutrality and on Ireland’s position in a future common European Security and Defence
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arrangement. According to Fine Gael, Ireland has traditionally reacted to EU issues 
concerning security rather than proactively staking out a position maintaining that 
domestically political debate on security issues rarely developed beyond accusations of 
“betraying” Irish Neutrality or safeguarding it in an integrated European Union. Fine Gael 
contend that regardless whether Irish people favour neutrality or not, the issue of European 
Defence co-operation is now up for discussion and the question is whether Ireland should 
be assisting in shaping the nature of the co-operation or wait for other nations to design a 
structure without Ireland’s influence because of Ireland’s neutral stance. Therefore, the 
issue is whether Ireland wants to be involved in framing a future European Defence project 
now, or wait until Ireland’s EU partners have made all the decisions.
4.3 Findings Interview Questionnaire
4.3.1 Mr Edward Brannigan -  First Secretary International Security Policy Section, 
Irish Dept of Foreign Affairs
While Irish Neutrality has no legal basis and is not enshrined either on the Constitution or 
in Irish Law, Mr Ed Brannigan of the Dept of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed to me that Irish 
military neutrality is a policy which the Irish Government is deeply attached emphasizing it 
as a policy espoused by successive Irish Governments with its core-defining characteristic 
being non-membership of military alliances. Mr. Brannigan stressed that there is no conflict 
between Ireland’s military neutrality and full and active support by Ireland for collective 
security, based on international law. He referred to the then Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera 
who stated in the Dâil in 1946 that declarations of neutrality are not enough and said that “ 
small nations have a particular reason for wishing to have security maintained by combined 
or collective effort”. Finally Mr Brannigan asserted that Article 2916 of the Irish 
Constitution is directly relevant to a neutral policy in so far as it affirms a devotion to the 
ideal of peace among nations, adheres to the pacific settlement of international disputes and 
accepts the generally recognized principles of international law.
16 Refer to Appendix 3 for Extract from Article 29 o f  Bunreacht na hÉireann.
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4.3.2 Prof Dermot Keogh -  Historian and Lecturer UCC
Prof Dermot Keogh believes that Ireland is neutral by accident in that in 1949 Ireland’s 
decision not to join NATO was based not on a fundamental objection to the aims of NATO 
but on a strategy to force the British to bring some démarche on the issue of Northern 
Ireland and was an attempt to bargain ones way into NATO rather than a principled 
objection to an alliance. He further contends that Irish Neutrality continued with difficulty 
with the possible emergence of a Third World War creating huge logistical problems for the 
Defence Forces throughout the 1950s up until recent times. During the Cold War period, 
Professor Dermot Keogh maintains that Irish Neutrality had some semblance of credibility 
in the sense that when Ireland first set out to join the UN immediately after World War 2, 
the then Attorney General wrote that there were some misgivings whether Ireland could 
adhere to a policy of neutrality and become a member of the United Nations. By 
maintaining a policy of neutrality there is a danger that we are compromising our own 
security by not being fully involved in the development of a defence pillai' of the European 
Community is a view expressed by Professor Keogh. When applying for membership of the 
EEC in 1961, the then Taoiseach Mr Sean Lemass outlined that Ireland would play an 
active and full role in this respect and according to Professor Keogh, Ireland must get 
involved in the process of European Defence issues thus not become some outsider looking 
in at the process due to the issue of neutrality. There has been a strong political benefit and 
a wide popularity for neutrality in Ireland in that neutrality has become identified with 
Ireland’s capacity to police and engage in peace keeping missions in a way that presents 
additional credibility or acceptability in countries where there are problems of peace 
enforcement and peace keeping. Professor Keogh outlined that Ireland has pledged itself 
from the very beginning of entry applications to play a lull role in the community 
institutions as they developed in all their totality even if it means a military dimension. 
Ireland according to Professor Keogh must focus on its vital interests and not just think 
about defence of the island in terms of defence of the periphery. Neutrality has always been 
pragmatic in Ireland’s case whereupon it served our interests. In the present day, Irish 
Neutrality has to be radically evaluated in terms of analysing whether neutrality serves our 
interests or becomes a barrier to participation in a security structure that would serve our 
national interests.
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4.3.3 Comdt Edward Horgan Retd - International Secretary Peace and Neutrality 
Alliance
Irish Neutrality is now non existent according to Comdt Edward Horgan Retd being of the 
opinion that while technically neutrality only exists in time of war, he would contend that, 
Ireland by affording American warplanes the facilities and use of Shannon Airport, is at 
present participating in a state of continuing war in Iraq, on behalf of one of the 
belligerents, the USA against the resistance forces in Iraq, and in contravention of the UN 
Charter.
Ireland’s policy of neutrality now has very little credibility according to Comdt Horgan due 
to the facilities being afforded to the US in Shannon Airport as he outlined that Justice 
Kearns ruled in the case, which Comdt Horgan took against the State in the High Court that 
Ireland was in breach of customary international law on neutrality. Comdt Horgan sees 
Irish Neutrality being veiy compatible with membership of the European Union depending 
on how Irish people envision the European Union developing. If the EU were to develop 
into a super Nation state, Irish Neutrality would not in his opinion be compatible as he 
contends that the EU should be a functional alliance of states or peoples, not a super state 
that could create a them and us situation with those outside Europe. He would consider 
neutrality as hugely important with neutral states within the EU providing alternative views 
of security.
Ireland would be enhancing its own security by maintaining a neutral stance according to 
Comdt Horgan and he contends that the lives of Irish people are being endangered in 
Ireland and overseas by Ireland aligning itself with aggressive military powers such as the 
USA. Participation in PfP according to Comdt Horgan undermines Irish Neutrality as he 
maintains that Irish participation in Kosovo17 very clearly breaches a neutral stance by 
Ireland, that it is a mistake to be serving under a NATO flag and under NATO Command. 
He believes that Ireland should differentiate what it can do, contending that Ireland could 
support what PfP are doing provided what is done by Ireland is under clear guidance and 
strictly under UN control.
17 Ireland is a troop contributor to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) a UN authorized mission under NATO  
Command.
4.3.4 Ms Patricia McKenna MEP - Green Party
Ms Patricia McKenna MEP views Irish Neutrality as a policy which could be used very 
actively and positively for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the pursuit 
of a fairer international system. Ms McKenna is also of the view that Irish Neutrality has 
now very little credibility with the facilities being afforded to American troops and 
warplanes on route to the conflict in Iraq. She does not believe that Ireland must be heavily 
armed to defend neutrality as this would be in her opinion open ended. She contends that 
Ireland’s best defence is not to threaten others and to put Ireland’s armed forces in to the 
service of the UN to prevent conflict. Ms McKenna maintains that Ireland’s armed forces 
are not needed by a military alliance such as NATO, Ireland has a positive reputation as 
impartial peacekeepers with the UN, Irish Neutrality opens up opportunities whereupon 
many countries would prefer Irish peacekeepers rather than peacekeepers from military 
aligned countries. It is her view that joining a military alliance would harm Ireland’s 
international reputation as impartial peacekeepers.
Ms McKenna contends that by participating in PfP, the Irish Defence forces, by training 
and promoting interoperability with NATO forces are assisting in the promotion and 
continuance of NATO. She also believes that when the Berlin Wall fell, there were many 
people who hoped that NATO would fade away as the Warsaw pact did. NATO is still in 
her belief based on a nuclear weapons strategy and on pre-emptive use of such weapons. 
Such ideas in her view are contrary to Irish Foreign policy and Ireland’s concept of 
neutrality.
4.3.5 Lt Gen Gerard McMahon Retd -  Former Chief of Staff Irish Defence Forces
One of the stipulations of the 1907 Hague Conventions is the capacity of a neutral country 
to be in a position to defend its neutrality. With regard to Ireland’s ability to defend 
neutrality, Lt Gen Gerry McMahon Retd considers that the Ireland’s policy of neutrality is 
not a credible policy, as Ireland has never possessed the necessary armed forces to 
guarantee its neutrality. Since independence there has been almost constant emphasis on 
how good Irelands version of neutrality has been for the Irish people. Lt Gen McMahon 
contends that Irish people were told that neutrality alone saved us from destruction and 
death during WW2, however he believes that it was our geographical position, the winning 
of the Battle of Britain by the RAF, Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union and the end 
of US neutrality that saved Ireland. The financial benefits of never having built and
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equipped a Defence Forces to underpin a policy of neutrality has allowed scarce resources
• 18to be deployed elsewhere. According to Lt Gen McMahon, the financial costs to the State 
of membership of NATO over the years would have been much greater than was Ireland’s 
‘head in the sand’ policy of military neutrality. However, he contends that a higher standard 
of training and professionalism in the Defence Forces might have emerged. He further 
maintains that our neutrality isolated us from world events in the years following WW2, 
being excluded from UN membership, which made us inward looking in foreign policy. 
According to Lt Gen McMahon, PfP is a mechanism for co-operation between NATO and 
non-NATO members which allows for their disparate forces to act together in peace 
support operations. With Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and even Russia members 
of the PfP process, membership for Ireland does not undermine a neutral policy.
4.3.6 Lt Col Jim Burke -  Lecturer Irish National Defence Policy, Military College
Lt Col Jim Burke expressed the view that Irish Neutrality was initially pragmatic, in so far 
as neutrality was used to express our individuality as a nation, avoiding casualties and 
political controversy by joining the Allies in the Second World War. He contends that Irish 
Neutrality has become increasingly principled from the late 1960s with Ireland’s opposition 
to nuclear weapons and increased emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution. However, it is 
now on very narrow ground due to acceptance of PfP membership, Petersberg19 tasks 
obligations and ‘support’ for the US war effort in Iraq. Lt Col Burke would also maintain 
that changes in security architecture in Europe have made the defending of national 
territory against attack less relevant now than in the 1940s. In Lt Col Burke’s assessment, 
Ireland’s policy of neutrality is credible on the veiy narrow basis of its definition which is 
non-membership of a military alliance. According to Lt Col Burke, Irish Neutrality should 
cost us in terms of greater expenditure to provide an independent defence capability and in 
terms of security in increasing our vulnerability to enemies. However, neither of these costs 
seem to apply in Ireland’s case due essentially to Ireland’s geostrategic position and no 
apparent military threat to the countiy.
18 Ireland’s Defence Expenditure expressed as a % o f  GDP is 0.7%. Source European Union Institute for 
Security Studies.
19 The Petersberg Tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks o f  combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace making. The Treaty o f  Amsterdam (1999) specified that the EU common 
defence policy was defined by the “Petersberg Tasks” which does not include a mutual defence commitment.
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Acceptability on United Nations peace support missions due to a neutral stance was also 
reiterated by Lt Col Burke who believes that neutrality assists Ireland in its relations with 
non-European nations within the UN framework and is also less politically controversial in 
Ireland. Membership of a military alliance would in his opinion impose a greater financial 
burden on the State compared to the low defence spend that currently exists.
Ireland’s flexible and narrow form of neutrality is likely to remain compatible with EU 
membership for some time according to Lt Col Burke as he contends that post Iraq there 
will be less pressure from the EU on Ireland to abandon or amend its neutral status as the 
existing neutral powers in the EU are far from being the most serious problem complicating 
EU-NATO relations. The present US administration is suspicious of a EU Defence identity 
and is estranged from previous ‘Atlanticisf allies such as Germany and Belgium. In 
addition to this both Spain and Italy are currently at odds with its public opinion on its pro 
US stance.
4.3.7 Mr Gay Mitchell TD - Fine Gael Spokesman on Foreign Affairs
The lack of proper debate and analysis of neutrality is a concern of Mr Gay Mitchell TD as 
he maintains that Irish Neutrality is an emotional subject where people equate neutrality 
with goodness but the problem is that the Irish people have based their views on emotions 
rather than argument and there has never being proper debate on Irish Neutrality because it 
has been a taboo subject. Ireland’s inability as a nation to defend itself militarily or defend 
its neutrality due to an ill equipped Defence Forces is a concern of Mr Mitchell and he 
stressed the vulnerability of Ireland not being a member of an alliance such as NATO. The 
other European neutrals such as Austria, Sweden and Finland are equipped to defend their 
neutrality which adds credibility to their neutral status, something that is lacking in 
Ireland’s neutral policy. According to Mr Mitchell, the real cost of Ireland’s neutral stance 
is that Ireland’s security is being compromised maintaining that the Irish government has 
failed in its first duty of providing for the security of its people. The world has changed and 
is changing rapidly. There are movements of populations through the world with threats 
existing now that did not prevail before September 2001 and in his view the biggest cost of 
Irish Neutrality is that Ireland has left itself vulnerable with its interpretation of neutrality. 
He believes that a secure Europe is a Europe with hope and Ireland’s best option is to join a 
EU Defence entity albeit carrying a protocol that will allow security and defence 
commitments on a case-by-case basis.
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
5.1 Findings Overview
My initial interest to explore Irish Neutrality was generated by Foreign Minister Cowen’s 
assertion stating that Ireland was militarily neutral and not politically neutral. This 
essentially appeared to me to be an ambiguous statement, however I now consider that 
Minister Cowen was being factual rather than ambiguous. This is explained by the defining 
characteristic of Irish Neutrality as non-membership of a military alliance, a narrow 
inteipretation of neutrality, which has benefited Ireland in her approach and conduct to 
Foreign Affairs and international relations. It is in ambiguity that lies the strength of Irish 
Neutrality as it is a policy that has facilitated economic development through foreign 
investment in Ireland along with economic integration in the EU while also being a policy 
that has precluded participation in military alliances and subsequent military/defence 
commitments. However I would posit that to be considered neutral would extend more than 
simply non-membership of a military alliance. In my view to be neutral, a neutral state 
must remain outside an armed conflict that involves other states. The provision of facilities 
at Shannon Airport to US troops in the Iraq conflict violated neutrality despite there being 
long standing arrangements between Ireland and the United States to allow the affording of 
facilities for military aircraft through Shannon. Justice Kearns expressed this violation of 
neutrality in his findings during the Horgan Case as he ruled that the use of Shannon 
Airport and Irish Airspace by US military aircraft was contrary to International Laws of 
Neutrality. Notwithstanding, Ireland is still by its own selective definition militarily neutral. 
However as I explained earlier, neutrality itself as a concept is difficult to define, and I have 
discovered in my research that there has been limited analytical debate on neutrality in 
Ireland. Various political commentators refer to neutrality but from my research the actual 
costs and benefits of a neutral policy have not been coherently argued or posited by any 
Irish political party or politician. Most references or allusions to Irish Neutrality seem to 
focus on the erosion of neutrality without actually outlining the costs or benefits of a 
continuation of this policy. It is this gap in knowledge that I intended to pursue.
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5.2 Emergence and Status of Irish Neutrality
My research has demonstrated that Irish Neutrality is not enshrined in any legal document, 
international treaty or in Bunreacht na hEireann. It is a pragmatic policy that has evolved 
from its first application during WW2 through to the present day. The adoption of a neutral 
stance during WW2 was interpreted by the Irish people as a demonstration of sovereignty, 
an expression of Anti-Britishness and a necessary option due to the issue of Partition. 
Given the importance that Partition and Ireland’s relationship with Britain played in the 
initial reasoning behind the adoption of a policy of neutrality, with the signing of the Anglo 
Irish Agreement in 1998, the time has come in my opinion to re-examine Ireland’s policy of 
neutrality. The Dept of Foreign Affairs PfP Explanatory Guide outlines that Ireland has 
never been ideologically neutral and is not isolated from evolving international security 
realities which implies that the status of Irish Neutrality could be subject to change should 
the Irish people so decide. As Fine Gael have pointed out in Beyond Neutrality (2003) there 
is a momentum within the EU to bring about a Common Defence entity and Ireland will 
have to decide whether to continue with non membership of military alliances, join an EU 
Common Defence structure or join a military alliance such as NATO.
5.2 Credibility of Irish Neutrality
Ireland’s inability to defend its neutrality due to an ill equipped Defence Forces makes a 
mockeiy of a neutral policy when one judges it against the obligations of a neutral state 
outlined in the 1907 Hague Conventions. However if Irish Neutrality is to be judged on the 
narrow definition of non-membership of a military alliance, then Irish Neutrality could be 
deemed a credible policy. That being said the question of facilitating the US with airport 
facilities for the transit of troops at Shannon Airport during the Iraq conflict surely 
compromises the credibility of Irish Neutrality by providing assistance to one belligerent 
and not the other. As outlined by Prof Dermot Keogh there has been a strong political 
benefit and popularity for neutrality in Ireland. This has been reflected on the world stage 
through acceptability and impartiality as a peacekeeping nation with the UN beyond what 
one would expect from Ireland’s limited resources or population base. A credible neutral 
policy would further enhance Ireland’s respectability as a peacekeeping nation on UN 
mandated peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions.
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5.3 Compatibility of Irish Neutrality with membership of International 
Organisations
Irish Neutrality is a flexible policy and reconciling neutrality with EU membership has 
presented Ireland with little difficulty as Ireland’s primary aim was economic development 
and the EEC was not viewed as a military alliance. Ireland in 1961 through its then 
Taoiseach Sean Lemass did assert that it would be willing to play its part in fulfilling its 
obligations on European security should the situation develop and so demand. Article 29 of 
the Constitution of Ireland sets out that the State “ affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace 
and friendly co-operation among nations founded on international justice and morality”, 
“its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes” and 
“international law as its rule of conduct in relations with other states”. Thus it is the 
application of Article 29 that sets out the foundation of Ireland’s Foreign policy. While 
neutrality is not specified in the Constitution, the focus on pacific settlement of 
international disputes, friendly co-operation and the adherence to international law would 
be encouraged by a policy of neutrality. Ireland regards the UN as the essential guarantor of 
international security and Ireland has willingly deployed members of the Defence Forces 
overseas with UN mandates both on peace keeping and peace enforcing missions. 
Participation on missions supported by a UN mandate would not conflict with a policy of 
neutrality but enhance such a policy.
5.4 Costs of Irish Neutrality
My research has shown that a neutral stance in WW2 resulted in Ireland being isolated 
from world events and precluded Ireland from being accepted into the UN until 1955. 
Today as Ireland becomes one of the more established members of the EU, the question has 
to be posed as to what extent should Ireland participate in European Defence mechanisms 
and to what extent does neutrality present a barrier to full participation in European 
Defence structures? By maintaining a policy of military neutrality Ireland runs the risk of 
isolating itself from the development of a defence pillar of the European Union and thus 
possibly compromising its own security. The new threats to international peace and security 
that now present itself through terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction may now demand that Ireland and other neutral countries play a more active 
role in European Defence mechanisms. By not being a member of a military alliance and by 
not participating fully in European Defence measures Ireland may be leaving itself isolated
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and vulnerable to terrorist threats. However if a policy of military neutrality is to be 
abandoned, then the costs to the exchequer would be greater than here to fore as Ireland 
would have to invest in meeting its commitments as a member of a military alliance.
5.5 Benefits of Irish Neutrality
As outlined by Lt Gen McMahon Retd, since independence there has been almost constant 
emphasis on how good Ireland’s version of neutrality has been for the Irish people. 
Neutrality has successfully represented an assertion of sovereignty by Ireland, a symbol of 
national identity and the Irish public perception of neutrality has been one of a successful 
policy that has kept Ireland free from the horrors of war. However, Lt Gen McMahon also 
outlined that it was the winning of the Battle of Britain by the RAF, Ireland’s geographical 
position and Hitler’s decision to attach the Soviet Union along with the end of US 
neutrality that saved Ireland during WW2. If this is the case, is it also the case that the 
benefits of a neutral stance during WW2 may have been overestimated.
There has been a political benefit from the adoption of a neutral policy in that Ireland 
ability to police and engage in peace-keeping missions has been enhanced through the 
aspect of impartiality and respect that is to be gained through neutrality. If Ireland were to 
join a military alliance this acceptability through impartiality resulting from a policy of 
neutrality would be diminished. In addition to reduced acceptability there is also the 
possibility of endangering the lives of Irish people by aligning ourselves with aggressive 
military powers such as the US or Britain that conduct military operations without a UN 
mandate.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
6.1 The preservation of neutrality has been embedded in the Irish national culture since 
the foundation of the State. It was not until the outbreak of WW2 that Ireland was in 
a position to affirm a neutral stance. By doing so Ireland established its sovereignty 
as an independent State with neutrality gradually becoming a symbol of Irish 
independence, valued by the Irish people and a fundamental aspect of Ireland’s 
approach to international affairs. However neutrality is difficult to define and 
Ireland’s concept of neutrality does not fit a classical design as Ireland professes to 
be militarily neutral but not politically neutral. In my view this can lead to a certain 
amount of ambiguity in inteipretation. A neutral stance probably saved Ireland from 
the ravages of WW2. However as I have demonstrated earlier, events may have 
been different in Ireland had the RAF not won the Battle of Britain or Hitler focused 
the energies of his war effort on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in Ireland 
neutrality has been perceived as a reason why Ireland has kept out of war and is 
cherished by the Irish people.
6.2 Ireland was subject to a form of isolation after WW2 and was not accepted into the 
UN until 1955. Since joining the UN, what has been perceived, as one of the major 
benefits of the neutral stance adopted by Ireland has been enhanced acceptability in 
UN missions resulting from Ireland’s impartiality through the application of a 
neutral policy. If Ireland were to join a military alliance, it would then be 
abandoning its altruistic role, a role that Ireland can have influence at global level 
especially within the UN structure. Since joining the UN in 1955, Ireland has 
consistently shown its readiness to deploy its armed forces on missions of both 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Providing aid or troops on UN peacekeeping 
missions in accordance with UN mandates compliments Irish Neutrality. It is 
through the UN that Ireland maintains its commitment in terms of international 
collective security.
6.3 World events have progressed dramatically since WW2 and the disestablishment of 
the Soviet Union. The first duty of government is to provide for the security of its
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citizens. The question has to be posed as to whether the Irish government is 
providing for the security of its citizens by remaining militarily neutral or are Irish 
citizens more vulnerable by Ireland not participating in a military alliance? It is no 
longer a case of keeping out of war as global security threats now threaten Ireland 
irrespective of a neutral military stance. In the post Cold War era there are new 
defence and security challenges as nations move away from the traditional defence 
mechanisms towards dealing with international terrorism, rogue states and the issue 
of weapons of mass destruction. Protection through neutrality may not be a probable 
benefit due to the emergence of global security threats.
6.4 Ireland is not ideologically neutral and this has been made clear by successive 
governments. Irish Neutrality is not a tangible subject, as it is not enshrined in any 
legal document or in the Irish Constitution. The Irish government believes that a 
policy of military neutrality is appropriate in the current international environment. 
While a cost of neutrality may be increased vulnerability, possible isolation from 
European Defence developments and a perception amongst European partners that 
Ireland is not playing its part in the development of a European Defence pillar, 
benefits can be realised through increased acceptability within the UN through 
impartiality, the affirmation of sovereignty and a means to avoid war. Membership 
of the PfP framework allows Ireland to cooperate on matters of training and 
common operational procedures with both neutral and non-neutral states. The extent 
of Ireland’s participation in the PfP process and association with militarily aligned 
states could affect the credibility of Irish Neutrality.
6.5 With increased European integration, continuous analysis of Irish Neutrality must 
be conducted in order to ascertain its appropriateness for Ireland and to assess 
whether a neutral policy supports or provides a barrier to protecting Irelands 
interests? It is my contention that neutrality is currently the most appropriate option 
for Ireland given Ireland’s military resources, geographical position and 
acceptability generated within the UN strengthened by Ireland’s non-membership of 
a military alliance. PfP membership does not undermine Irish Neutrality as other 
neutral countries are actively involved in this process. This framework provides a 
platform for Ireland to militarily relate more effectively with other countries,
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promote neutral views and procedures without becoming actively involved in or 
joining a military alliance.
6 . 6  There has been little debate on neutrality in Ireland except that some politicians 
have referred to apparent threats to Irish Neutrality without actually assessing the 
costs and benefits of a neutral stance. What is required is enlightened debate on the 
subject in order that the Irish people fully understand the meaning of neutrality, its 
consequences, obligations, rules of international law and the costs involved by 
continuing with a neutral stance in today’s changing world. Providing assistance to 
US military aircraft at Shannon Airport may not be deemed participation in the US- 
Iraq conflict, and while Ireland is not part of a military alliance, the distinction 
between political neutrality and military neutrality is now somewhat blurred. In the 
final analysis, it appears that through its flexibility, non-tangibility, and indeed 
subjectivity, it is probably impossible to portray Irish Neutrality in a numerical type 
analysis of costs and benefits. While Ireland develops as an established member of 
an increasingly integrated EU that is facing new challenges and more varied global 
security threats, it is my contention that currently a neutral stance is appropriate for 
Ireland but the continuance of a neutral policy should be debated at the highest level 
of political leadership in Ireland to assess its continued appropriateness in the 21st 
Century.
“The hottest place in hell is fo r those who are neutral”
(Dante; cited by Keohane, 2001: 4)
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APPENDIX 1
CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL 
POWERS AND PERSONS IN CASE OF WAR ON LAND 
The Hague, 18 October 1907
Art. 1. The Territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.
Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of
war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.
Art. 3. Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or 
other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerents on land 
or sea;
(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the 
territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not 
been opened for the service of public messages.
Coips of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the 
territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.
A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 
to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its 
neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.
The responsibility of a neutral power is not engaged by the fact of persons 
crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the 
belligerents.
Art. 4.
Art. 5.
Art.6.
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Art.7. A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export of transport, on
behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in 
general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet.
Art.8. A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of
the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy 
apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.
Art.9. Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in
regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8  must be impartially 
applied by it to both belligerents. A neutral Power must see to the same 
obligation being observed by companies or private individuals owning 
telegraph cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus.
Art. 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its
neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.
Source: International Law Concerning the Conduct of Hostilities, (1996), International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
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APPENDIX 2
Extract from Article 28.3 of Bunreacht na hEineann
28.3.1 War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the 
assent of Dail Eireann.
28.3.2 In the case of actual invasion, however, the Government may take whatever 
steps they may consider necessary for the protection of the State, and Dail 
Eireann if not sitting shall be summoned to meet at the earliest practicable 
date.
28.3.3 Nothing in this Constitution other than Article 15.5.2° shall be invoked to 
invalidate any law enacted by the Oireachtas which is expressed to be for the 
puipose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in 
time of war or aimed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or purporting to be 
done in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law. In this 
sub-section "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an 
aimed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which 
each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that, arising out of 
such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests 
of the State and "time of war or armed rebel-lion" includes such time after 
the termination of any war, or of any such armed conflict as aforesaid, or of 
an armed rebellion, as may elapse until each of the Houses of the Oireachtas 
shall have resolved that the national emergency occasioned by such war, 
armed conflict, or armed rebellion has ceased to exist.
Source: Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) enacted by the People 1st July 1937.
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APPENDIX 3
Extract from Article 29 of Bunreacht na hEireann
29.1 Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst 
nations founded on international justice and morality.
29.2 Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of 
international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
29.3 Ireland accepts the generally recognized principles of international law as its rule of 
conduct in its relations with other States.
29.4.1 The executive power of the State in or in connection with its external relations shall 
in accordance with Article 28 of this Constitution be exercised by or on the 
authority of the Government.
29.4.2 For the purpose of the exercise of any executive function of the State in or in 
connection with its external relations, the Government may to such an extent and 
subject to such conditions, if any, as may be determined by law avail of or adopt 
any organ, instrument, or method of procedure used or adopted for the like purpose 
by the members of any group or league of nations with which the State is or 
becomes associated for the purpose of international co-operation in matters of 
common concern.
Source: Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) enacted by the People 1st July 1937.
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APPENDIX 4
Neutral European Countries: Austria. Switzerland. Sweden, Finland, Ireland
Austria is bound to neutrality by the 1955 Austrian State treaty and its constitution, which 
prohibits entry into military alliances and the establishment of foreign military bases on 
Austrian territory. Austrian neutrality is actually an enforced neutrality. The territory of 
Austria was occupied by allied forces until 1955. In 1955 the Soviet Union, in the Moscow 
memorandum, demanded Austrian neutrality on the model of Switzerland and expressed a 
preparedness for pledges by the four powers to the integrity and inviolability of Austrian 
territory. All of the countries with which Austria had diplomatic relations ratified the 
Austrian State Treaty.
Switzerland received its neutrality through the Peace of Westphalia (1640) which ended 
the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. It also confirmed the independence of the Swiss 
Confederation. After France occupied a large part of the Confederation’s territory, the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 re-established the Swiss Confederation and an act, signed on 
20 December 1815 by Austria, France, England, Prussia and Russia, guaranteed permanent 
neutrality for Switzerland.
Sweden bases its policy of neutrality on tradition rather than on international treaty. During 
military conflicts in the first half of the 19th century Sweden maintained its neutral status. 
Neutrality was formally proclaimed by King Gustav XIV in 1834. Sweden had long been a 
strong military power, but it adapted the policy of neutrality to its own political interests. In 
1941 it allowed German forces transit through Swedish territory to the Finnish front, and at 
the same time protected refugees from Nazism. After 1945 Sweden opted to preserve its 
neutral status. Sweden’s security was strongly dependent on the status of Finland and 
indirectly on the policy of the USSR towards Finland as well.
Finland derives its policy of neutrality from the period directly following the Second 
World War. Its interest in remaining neutral conflicts between great powers was first 
recognized in a treaty between Finland and the USSR in 1948 (the Treaty of Friendship 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance). The treaty forbids the signatories to join a military
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alliance against the other, and Finland could not allow its territory to be used for an attack 
on the USSR. Finland was also bound to preserve its neutrality through adequate armed 
forces. Finland’s neutrality does not have roots in international law, and there are no 
international pledges for its neutrality. Thus Finland, like Austria, is a case of enforced 
neutrality, again by the USSR.
Ireland implemented a policy of neutrality during the Second World War. In 1949 Ireland 
was invited to join NATO, but did not accept the invitation because it did not wish to join 
an alliance that also included Great Britain. In doing so, Ireland established the unification 
of Ireland as a condition, which was unacceptable to Great Britain. In actuality, during the 
Cold War period, Ireland belonged to the West in the political sense, and it was also clear 
that NATO would protect Ireland in case of war between the great powers, also because 
part of the island is ruled by Great Britain.
Source: :http//nato.gov.si/ena/topic/national-seciiritv/neutral-statiis/neiitral- countries/
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APPENDIX 5
60 Command and Staff Course 
The Military College 
Curragh Camp 
Co Kildare
Tel: 045-445114
Dear______________
As part of my Command and Staff Course I am presently undertaking a research study in partial 
fulfillment of a Master of Arts in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies. The title of my 
research study is “ Irish Neutrality: What are the Costs and Benefits of Ireland’s Policy of Neutrality?”
It would be of tremendous benefit and assistance to me in my research if  I could interview you to 
ascertain your views and observations on Irish Neutrality. In order to assess the costs and benefits of a 
neutral policy I am exploring Irish Neutrality under the themes of the emergence of Irish Neutrality 
along with its credibility and compatibility in relation to membership of international organisations. 
Attached please find a proposed questionnaire which I would intend to use during our interview.
Your assistance in my research would be greatly appreciated.
Yours sincerely
Comdt Conor Burke
Contact Address above or conor.burke@defenceforces.ie
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IRISH NEUTRALITY - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Hereunder please find the central themes under which I am examining Irish Neutrality. 
Emergence of Irish Neutrality
1. How would you describe Irish Neutrality?
2. Why is neutrality important for the Irish people?
Credibility of Irish Neutrality
3. How credible is Ireland’s policy of neutrality?
4. How relevant is the concept of neutrality given the change in World Order?
5. Does Neutrality undermine Ireland’s efforts in the war against terrorism?
6 . Is Ireland an international burden to its neighbours by being neutral?
Costs of Irish Neutrality
7. Is Ireland compromising its own security by maintaining a neutral stance?
8 . What limitations does Irish Neutrality present for Ireland in International Affairs?
9. In your view what are the costs of Irish Neutrality?
Benefits of Irish Neutrality
10. What are the benefits of Irish Neutrality?
11. Why should/should not Ireland move away from a traditional stance of neutrality? 
Compatibility of Irish Neutrality
12. How compatible is Irish Neutrality with membership of the EU?
13. How compatible is UN membership with Irish Neutrality?
14. What neutrality implications exist for Ireland by participating in the PfP
programme?
15. How could membership of PfP undermine Irish Neutrality?
APPENDIX 6
40
Bibliography
Bell, J. (2002) ‘Doingyour Research Project London, Open University Press.
Brennock, M. (2003) ‘Qualified yes to joining common EU defence’, The Irish Times, 
Dublin, 17 May, p.7.
Cameron, F. (1999) The Foreign and Security Policy o f  The European Union, Past, Present 
and Future, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press.
Campbell, L. (2003) ‘Britain’s Changing Attitude to Irish Neutrality - 1938 to 1950’ 
Defence Forces Review, 2003: 29-34.
Clonan, T. (2003) ‘Chance to Sway Defence Policy in EU’, The Irish Times, Dublin, 21 
October, p l 6 .
Cusack, J. (1999) ‘Joining PFP will give Defence Forces role in future major military 
operations’, The Irish Times, Dublin, 30 January, p. 12.
Denscombe, M. (2000) The Good Research Guide, Buckingham, Open University Press.
De Breadun, D (2004) ‘Neutral Ireland will have key role implementing EU security 
strategy’, The Irish Times, Dublin, 12 January, p. 12.
Doherty, R. (2002) Ireland, Neutrality and European Integration, Hampshire, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd.
Doyle, A (2001) ‘Ireland -  Neutral about whatV, Kildare Conference on Neutrality, 
Available from <URL: http//www.avrildovle.ie/speeches neutrality.htm >.
Driscoll,D.(1982) Is Ireland Really Neutral? Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1:3,55-61
Duggan, J. (1989) Neutral Ireland and The Third Reich, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan Ltd.
41
Duggan, J. (1996) Traditional Neutrality Tomorrow, Dublin, An Cosantoir Review, 17-35.
Eliassen, K. (1999) Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, London, Sage 
Publications Ltd.
Fanning, R. (1982) Irish Neutrality -  An Historical Review, Dublin, Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 1:3, 27-37.
Fanning, R. (1983) Independent Ireland, Dublin, Helicon Ltd.
Fine Gael,(2003) Beyond Neutrality, Dublin, available from 
<URL: http ://www. finegael .ie/beyond neutrality/media/fgneutrality>.
Fisk, R. (1985) In Time o f War Ireland, Ulster and the Price o f  Neutrality 1939-45, Dublin, 
Gill and Macmillan Ltd.
Fitzgerald, G. (1998) The Origins, Development and Present Status of Irish Neutrality, 
Dublin, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 9, 11-19.
Fitzgerald, W. (1982) Irish Unification and NATO, Dublin, Dublin University Press.
Flick, U. (1998) An Introduction to Qualitative Research, London, Sage.
Hakovirta, H. (1988) East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Holland, K. (2003) ‘Neutrality is military, not political, says Cowen,’ The Irish Times, 
Dublin, 06 February, p i2.
Holsti, K. (1977) International Politics - A  Frameworkfor Am lysis, New Jersey, Prentice- 
Hall.
42
Keatinge, P. (1978) A Place Among the Nations, Dublin, Institute of Public 
Administration.
Keatinge, P. (1984) A Singular Stance Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, Dublin, Institute of 
Public Administration.
Keatinge, P.(1995) Towards a Safer Europe-Small State Security Policies and the 
European Union: Implications fo r  Ireland, Dublin, Institute of European Affairs.
Keatinge, P. (1996) European Security Ireland’s Choices, Dublin, Institute of European 
Affairs.
Keogh, D. (1990) Ireland & Europe 1919-1989 A Diplomatic and Political History, 
Dublin, Hibernian University Press.
Keohane, D. (2001) Realigning Neutrality? Irish Defence Policy and the EU, Paris, 
Institute for Security Studies
Maguire, J. (1999) Defending Peace For An Alternative to NATO/PfP and a M ilitarised 
Europe, Dublin, Afri Grand Canal House, Dublin.
Maguire, J. (2002) Defending Peace: Ireland’s Role in a Changing Europe, Cork, Cork 
University Press.
Manning, M (1999) James Dillon -A Biography, Dublin, Wolfhound Press Ltd.
Manseragh, M. (1997) Nationalism and Independence, Cork, Cork University Press.
Manseragh, M (2003) The Legacy o f  History, Cork, Mercier Press.
Marsh, M. (1992) Irish Public Opinion on Neutrality and The European Union, Dublin, 
Institute of European Affairs.
Murphy, J. (1975) Ireland in the Twentieth Centuty, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan Ltd.
Murphy, P. and Shrivastava, B. (1991) Neutrality and Non-Alignment in the 1990s, 
London, Sangam Books Ltd.
Murphy, R. (2002) ‘Ireland, Peacekeeping and Defence Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ in Tonra,B. and Ward,E (eds) Ireland in International Affairs, Dublin, 
Institute of Public Administration pp. 13- 45.
McMahon, G. (1999) ‘Joining Partnership for Peace is obvious way for us to go’, The 
Examiner, Cork, 02 August, p. 11.
McSweeney, B. (1999) Security, Identity and Interests, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
O’Doherty I (2004) ‘Forget Neutrality -  It’s time for us to take sides’, Irish Independent, 
Dublin, 19 April, p. 12.
O’Halpin, E. (1999), Defending Ireland. The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
PAN A, (2003) ‘Irish Neutrality and US Foreign Policy’, (cited 18 February 2003). 
Available from URL:http//www.pana.ie/idn/0302b.html
Patterson, H. (2002) Ireland Since 1939, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (1998) A Common Foreign Policy fo r  Europe, London, 
Routledge.
Robson, C. (2002) Real World Research 2nd Edition, London, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Salmon, T. (1989) Unneutral Ireland, Oxford, Clarendon Press Oxford.
44
Sharp, P. (1990) Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, Aldershot, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company.
Silverman, D. (2000) Doing Qualitative Research, London, Sage.
Silverman, D. (2001) Interpreting Qualitative Data, London, Sage.
Tonra, B. and Ward, E. (2002) Ireland in International Affairs Interest, Institutions and 
Identities, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration.
Vigor, P.(1975) The Soviet View o f  War Peace and Neutrality, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd.
Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars, London, Penguin Books Ltd.
45
